Computing systems are finding their way into increasingly sensitive roles and settings: medical systems that manage patient care records and that link providers with hospitals and pharmacies, computer-assisted air traffic control systems, systems that administer energy delivery and electric power grids, and systems for chemical refineries and railroads. In these and other uses, we need computers we can trust.
Yet we're also seeing wave upon wave of viruses. The most virulent to date infected several million machines in about 20 minutes, but scientists speculate that hundreds of millions of machines could someday be compromised in a fraction of a second if the Internet's vulnerabilities remain unaddressed. Spyware infests desktop machines, capturing every keystroke for scrutiny by marketing organizations even as they pop up unwanted browser windows. A whole black market has sprung up around tools for breaking into Web sites some for kicks, others for identity theft. Indeed, faced with monthly reports of thefts involving millions of credit card numbers, some consumers are voicing concerns about the robustness of the entire banking system. Vendors aren't unaware of the issue. Bill Gates has singled out security as Microsoft's most pressing priority. Yet in the tension between new product features and security features, the market favors hot new ideas. "Market failure" is often cited as the main reason that modern computing platforms (such as Web services, the next new thing) offer such desultory options for security, reliability, scalability, self-management, guaranteed responsiveness, and self-administration. Vendors insist that customers complain loudly but don't actually make purchasing decisions based on security and related technologies.
We're surrounded by unreliable, insecure computing products. People buy and deploy them anyhow, and their children spend idle hours breaking them. Vendors are aware of the issue, but have finite dollars and need to focus on the bottom line. So they offer new products, which prove to be as unreliable and insecure as ever. But people continue to buy and deploy them anyhow.
Ending the cycle
If there's to be any hope for breaking the cycle, it's going to require a response on many levels. The problems we're confronting have many dimensions: not merely technical, but also ethical, legal, and economic. Why do so many kids view breaking into computer systems as a game? What good are unenforceable IP laws? And conversely, why aren't computing companies liable for their products' inadequacies? Why is the technology economy indifferent to software product quality?
A significant issue stems from computing's traditional insularity as a research field. We've treated computing a bit like mathematical physics. Researchers uncover deep truths and teach generation after generation of scientists and engineers, but without engaging in serious dialog outside the field's traditional boundaries. If a problem has ramifications beyond the purely technical, we tend to view them as someone else's issue. This isn't right. Every student in any university is immersed in technology and, whether he or she feels like a victim or an empowered user, needs to understand networked computing systems' potential and limitations. The dialog shouldn't be purely technical. We need to debate the trade-offs that arise when a computing system with security limitations is deployed in a setting, such as a hospital, where privacy is paramount. We need dialog around the split between what Lawrence Lessig terms "East Coast Code" (law) and "West Coast Code" (software). 1 We should tackle some of the complex legal ramifications of ubiquitous communications, computing, and software systems.
Power and responsibility
Take the electric power grid. In the past, when monopolies owned and operated this infrastructure, responsibility for reliability was clear-cut. Today, the grid is a competitive marketplace operated by communities that include producers, consumers, the independent service operators that control long-distance lines, the companies that own the lines connected to our homes, and even consumers who generate some of their own power. Control increasingly uses Internet protocols (albeit operating in a kind of private intranet), and the computers are no different from those that any other commercial networking enterprise uses. Some parts of these systems have portals to the Internet.
Yet consider how little we know about operating such a network in a secure, reliable, monitored, and managed way! After all, these are massive systems with hundreds of thousands of components. Moreover, to the extent that we have technological ideas, legal and regulatory constraints have a big impact on what kinds of solutions we can and can't deploy. Beyond these, economic incentives are key: operators won't deploy solutions unless they benefit financially by doing so. Thus, if you narrow the discourse to ignore these many facets, you simply end up with an artificial and irrelevant problem statement, and a solution no grid operator would take seriously.
Building trust
In short, unless we begin to teach our students how to build trustworthy computing systems, viewing trust in an enlarged way, and use that broad perspective to help frame the underlying technical issues, we can't expect those students to go forth and build those systems. Until we begin a broader dialog with those who are impacted by computing indeed, immersed in computing and yet aren't viewed as traditional stakeholders in the dialog, we'll continue to build systems that impact them negatively without appreciating our actions' consequences.
It's about time for a new engagement on the trust issue. To develop computer systems we can trust, we'll need a broader social appreciation of the dimensions and limitations of trust in technology. And we need to begin to take control of those limitations' implications, rather than blindly building and deploying systems that simply can't rise to the standards of trust that their roles would seem to demand.
Conclusion
I'm an optimist, and I believe we can solve this challenge. But it will take a broad engagement by the field as a whole, and that engagement needs to start with some dialog and debate of the issue. It's past time for that debate to begin.
